

INTERROGATION REPORT ON

FRIEDHELM BAECHLE

W/T OPERATOR WITH KO SPAIN

The attached document is a report of the inter-rogation of Friedhelm BAECHLE, W/T operator with Abwehr/Abt I-1 in Madrid, at 6824 DIC OBERURSEL, by Major W. P. Bundy AUS on 31st July 1945.

TICOM
8th August, 1945

No. of pages 3

Distribution:

British

Director
D.D. 3
D.D. 4
D.D. (N.S.)
D.D. (M.W.)
D.D. (A.S.)
A.D. (C.C.R.) (2)
Lt. Col. Leathem

U.S.

OP 20-G (2) (via Lt. Pendergrass)
G-2 (via Lt. Col. Hilles)
S.S.A. (2) (via Major Seaman)
Director, S.I.D. USFET
(via Lt. Col. Johnson)

TICOM

Chairman
S.A.C. (2)
Cdr. Bacon
Cdr. McKenzie
Cdr. Tandy
Lt. Col. Johnson
Lt. Col. Lewis Powell
Lt. Cdr. Manson
Major Seaman
Lt. Eachus
Lt Vance
Capt. Cowan
Lt. Fehl
Ticom Files (2)

Additional

Major Morgan
S.A.C. for Section V

Do NOT Destroy Return to the
NSA Technical Library when no longer needed
3-4561 Ticom No. 2

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 13526

INTERROGATION OF FRIEDHELM BAICHLE AT 6824 DIC, OBERURSEL, 31 JULY 1945

1. Personalia. B. BAICHLE, Friedhelm. Was a radio operator for Abwehr Abteilung I-i in Madrid from July 1940 to November 1944. He was then returned to Germany where he worked as an operator at the Berlin end of the same radio link to Madrid (Dienststelle BERLIN/ST. INNE-DORF). He claims to have been engaged in anti-Nazi activities from 1942 on. His attitude under interrogation was completely cooperative.

2. The work of Abwehr I. As a radio operator in Abwehrabteilung I-i, B. was completely familiar with the reconnaissance network of the Abwehr in Spain. Incoming reports came from special observation posts in the ports and these reports were transmitted by Madrid to Berlin. This network was built up from the beginning of the war until 1942 and was used to the end of the war. It handled meteorological information for the Luftwaffe as well as information on shipping movements. The following observation post locations were given: Barcelona, Valencia, Cadiz, Vigo, La Coruna, Bilbao, San Sebastian, Palma de Mallorca. B. did not handle any traffic connected with such activities as counter-intelligence or other forms of agent activity.

B. was not familiar with the details of any other subsection of Abwehr I, although he knew that the sections I-M, I-L and I-H were those concerned with the Marine, Luftwaffe and Heer respectively. I-M was responsible for originating the ship movement reports which were the bulk of the traffic on his link.

B. was not familiar with the activities of Abwehr II. Abwehr III appears to have been chiefly concerned with questions of personnel security, while Abwehr Z was the administrative section.

3. The Berlin-Madrid Abwehr link. The radio receiver was located at the embassy and the transmitter in one of the annexes thereof. Abw I-i was responsible for the W/T operation, telegraphy, teletype and the cryptography of the Abw organization. Teletype to Berlin was used up till August 1943 for a large share of the traffic, but was never completely satisfactory and its use ceased after that time because of the damage done by Allied air attacks in France.

4. In addition to Berlin, the Madrid Abw station was in contact with Toulon, Marseilles, Bordeaux, Paris, Sicily, Rome, Barcelona, Cadiz, Bilbao and San Sebastian. Different systems were used on these links than those in use to Berlin.

5. Cipher methods. B. as a radio operator was not admitted to the code room itself, and his knowledge of the cipher systems used was extremely sketchy and vague. He did mention the following cryptographic systems: a) Hand keys--These were used by the outstations which were too small to have machines. The system at first employed ordinary published books with a stencil. A five letter group was used to indicate page and line. B. was not clear whether the result was used as an additive to a prearranged code, or as a one-time pad arrangement, and could in fact give no details on this. The system was later superseded by a handkey called Schluesselvorschrift 41 of which again he could give no details. b) Enigma. This was used by the central station at Madrid and by major outstations throughout the war. c) The "K-machine". B. insisted that his was different from Enigma, though similar in having three wheels and in being electrically operated. He described it as larger in

INTERROGATION OF FRIEDHELM BAICHLE AT 6824 DIC, OBERURSEL, 31 JULY 1945

1. Personalia. BAICHLE, Friedhelm. Was a radio operator for Abwehr Abteilung I-i in Madrid from July 1940 to November 1944. He was then returned to Germany where he worked as an operator at the Berlin end of the same radio link to Madrid (Dienststelle BERLIN/ST. INNE-DORF). He claims to have been engaged in anti-Nazi activities from 1942 on. His attitude under interrogation was completely cooperative.

2. The work of Abwehr I. As a radio operator in Abwehrabteilung I-i, B. was completely familiar with the reconnaissance network of the Abwehr in Spain. Incoming reports came from special observation posts in the ports and these reports were transmitted by Madrid to Berlin. This network was built up from the beginning of the war until 1942 and was used to the end of the war. It handled meteorological information for the Luftwaffe as well as information on shipping movements. The following observation post locations were given: Barcelona, Valencia, Cadiz, Vigo, La Coruna, Bilbao, San Sebastian, Palma de Mallorca. B. did not handle any traffic connected with such activities as counter-intelligence or other forms of agent activity.

B. was not familiar with the details of any other subsection of Abwehr I, although he knew that the sections I-M, I-L and I-H were those concerned with the Marine, Luftwaffe and Heer respectively. I-M was responsible for originating the ship movement reports which were the bulk of the traffic on his link.

B. was not familiar with the activities of Abwehr II. Abwehr III appears to have been chiefly concerned with questions of personnel security, while Abwehr Z was the administrative section.

3. The Berlin-Madrid Abwehr link. The radio receiver was located at the embassy and the transmitter in one of the annexes thereof. Abw I-i was responsible for the W/T operation, telegraphy, teletype and the cryptography of the Abw organization. Teletype to Berlin was used up till August 1943 for a large share of the traffic, but was never completely satisfactory and its use ceased after that time because of the damage done by Allied air attacks in France.

4. In addition to Berlin, the Madrid Abw station was in contact with Toulon, Marseilles, Bordeaux, Paris, Sicily, Rome, Barcelona, Cadiz, Bilbao and San Sebastian. Different systems were used on these links than those in use to Berlin.

5. Cipher methods. B. as a radio operator was not admitted to the code room itself, and his knowledge of the cipher systems used was extremely sketchy and vague. He did mention the following cryptographic systems: a) Hand keys--These were used by the outstations which were too small to have machines. The system at first employed ordinary published books with a stencil. A five letter group was used to indicate page and line. B. was not clear whether the result was used as an additive to a prearranged code, or as a one-time pad arrangement, and could in fact give no details on this. The system was later superseded by a handkey called Schluesselvorschrift 41 of which again he could give no details. b) Enigma. This was used by the central station at Madrid and by major outstations throughout the war. c) The "K-machine". B. insisted that his was different from Enigma, though similar in having three wheels and in being electrically operated. He described it as larger in

construction, and with a fourth wheel, designated by the letter "D" (he was positive of this) which had to be wired up. He was unable to give any further details but said that the machine was used alongside the Enigma, though on different links of the network. d) Schlüsselgeraet 42. (He repeated this number several times.) This was described as a handmachine with a keyboard, operated by a handle which was pulled down by the left hand after the encipherment of each letter. The use of this was begun in 1943 and continued to the end of the war, especially on the Berlin link. e) A machine the technical name of which B. did not know, but which he described as apparently similar to the "Geraet 42", but smaller and electrically operated. He had never seen the inside of either the 42 or this machine. f) Teletype machine. B. said there was a machine built into the teletype but he had never been familiar with it all.

6. Contents of traffic. B. said that about 40% of the radio traffic was administrative--arrivals and departures of personnel, etc. The rest was almost entirely ship movements and after 1942 plane movements as well.

7. Signal intelligence activities of the Abwehr. B. knew of a "Horchabteilung" which he believed to be located in the Consulate General. He knew this only because he would come in occasional contact with the radio operators who were not connected with his outfit, but who spoke vaguely of this unit. The two groups were not allowed to mix regularly. In addition, he had seen a few messages for this Abteilung which had come on his link, but these were so few that he had assumed the Abteilung had its own communications.

8. Other suspected sigint activities. B. also spoke of an Amt VI of the RSHA, which he believed to be connected with this Horchdienst. However, he had no more definite information, knew no personalities, and had never seen any messages to or from this office.

9. Ousting of the Abwehr by RSHA. After the 20 July plot, Abw activities in Spain were severely curtailed and taken over by the RSHA in the person of Oberstleut. Kleyenstueber. However, B. thought that Dienststelle Berlin/Stahmsdorf was still under OKW. He was extremely vague about the changes which took place at this time at the top.

Note: A full report on this man is being prepared by DIC-USFET, the distribution including CI-War Room, London. The above is believed to include all information of interest to TICOM.